Personal views on the history of Swiss banking secrecy. Not legal, tax or investment advice. Researched and drafted with AI assistance — every substantive claim is linked to its source so you can read the original yourself.
Swiss banking secrecy did not begin with a noble gesture. It began with a police raid in Paris.
On 27 October 1932, French police walked into the Paris offices of Basler Handelsbank, one of the big Swiss banks of its day, and walked out with its client records. The lists held more than a thousand names. Among those later made public were three senators, a dozen generals, two bishops, several former ministers, and the families behind Peugeot and Coty.1
Two years later, Switzerland made it a crime for a banker to talk.
That is the real beginning of Article 47 of the Banking Act, the sentence of law the world knows as Swiss banking secrecy. It is not the beginning most of us were taught. And it leaves a question that is still argued over dinner in this country: was banking secrecy made for the banks, or for the citizens?
I went back to the historians to find out. The answer is more interesting than either side’s slogan, and it explains a good deal about Swiss private banking as it is today.
Swiss Banking Secrecy: The Short Answer
- Article 47 of the Banking Act of 1934 was written at the request of the banks. It gave criminal protection to a duty of discretion that already existed.
- The popular story that Swiss banking secrecy was created to protect Jewish savings from the Nazi regime first appears in 1966. Historians, including the Bergier Commission, do not support it.
- The principle behind it, financial privacy from one’s own state, was confirmed by Swiss voters again and again. At home, that part of banking secrecy still stands. Towards other countries it ended between 2009 and 2018.
Banking Secrecy Before the Law: A Habit Becomes a Product
Swiss banking secrecy is older than the law that made it famous. For most of the nineteenth century it was a professional habit, like the silence of a doctor, a lawyer or a priest. Robert U. Vogler, a Basel historian who was spokesman of Union Bank of Switzerland and later headed historical research at UBS, finds only scattered rules before 1934. A banker who talked could be sued by the client for damages, and nothing more than that.2
You will often read that it all began in Geneva in 1713. Perhaps. The historians of the 1934 law do not build on that date. Instead, they describe something less romantic. Around 1900 Switzerland’s neighbours began to tax wealth and inheritance in earnest, and Swiss banks noticed.
How Discretion Became a Selling Point
Sébastien Guex of the University of Lausanne, whose study of Swiss banking secrecy is the standard reference, found a circular that a large Swiss bank sent to French clients in October 1910. It promised to manage their securities with the utmost discretion. The advertising grew so loud before the First World War that the Swiss economics minister, worried about retaliation, asked the bankers to tone it down.1
Then came the war that Switzerland stayed out of. The country emerged with one of the world’s strongest currencies, mild taxes and a stable political system, while its neighbours taxed to pay for the wreckage. Between 1913 and 1929 the combined balance sheets of the Swiss big banks grew from 26 to 73 per cent of those of their French rivals.3
As a result, a habit had become a product. Moreover, the product had critics from the start. The Geneva historian Christophe Farquet shows that Swiss banking secrecy was first challenged on the international stage about a century ago, in the negotiations on double taxation and tax evasion between the wars, and that Swiss diplomacy defended it successfully.4
The Voters Had Already Been Asked
One detail matters for the question of this post. In those same years the Swiss were asked more than once to open the books. Parliament rejected Social Democratic motions to make banks inform the tax authorities in 1915 and again in 1920. In 1922 voters buried a federal wealth levy by 736,952 votes to 109,702.2 Long before any criminal article existed, proposals that would have opened the banks to the tax office found no majority.
Paris, October 1932
Back to the raid. The seized papers showed that the bank had for years arranged transfers and tax evasion for wealthy French clients. Searches at Banque d’Escompte Suisse and at a Geneva private bank followed. The sum most often quoted at the time was one billion French francs in undeclared assets. Guex thinks the true figure was at least double.1
On 10 November the affair reached the French Chamber of Deputies, which demanded action against tax fraud. France then froze the French assets of the three banks. When two board members of the Basel bank refused to let French officials inspect the books in Basel, the French authorities held a manager and his deputy in prison for about two months. On 21 November Paris asked Bern for judicial assistance. However, the Federal Council refused outright. An internal paper gave the reason: assistance would damage the business that Swiss banks drew from foreign deposits.1
Pressure at Home, Agents on Swiss Soil
At the same moment the ground was shifting at home. In 1930 the Federal Supreme Court had widened the banks’ duty to disclose client information in attachment proceedings. In 1932 it turned down appeals by Basler Handelsbank and Credit Suisse.1
And foreign agents were at work on Swiss soil. After Germany imposed capital controls in 1931, a German national tried to obtain information from the staff of a Swiss bank and was expelled. Further cases soon followed.2 In December 1932 the Swiss envoy in Paris reported that French agents were spying on banks in Swiss towns.1
Put yourself in a Swiss banker’s chair that winter. Your most valuable promise to foreign clients rests on custom and a civil claim for damages. A clerk who sells a client list to a foreign tax inspector risks a lawsuit, not prison. And two neighbouring states are running informants in your city.
Not every historian weighs the Paris affair the same way. Vogler sees it as one burden among several for a bank already weakened by its German loans, and he puts the banking crisis first.2 On the sequence of events there is no dispute.
The Trade of 1934: Supervision for Banking Secrecy
The Swiss parliament did not pass a law in 1934 to create banking secrecy. It passed a law to supervise banks, because banks were failing.
The German moratorium of 1931 froze more than a billion francs of Swiss bank money. In December 1933 the Confederation had to put 100 million francs into Schweizerische Volksbank to keep it alive.2 Of the eight big banks, one went under and five survived only through deep restructuring.3 Therefore, after a rescue with public money, supervision was no longer a question of if.
What the Banks Asked For
The banks had resisted a banking law for years. What they could still shape was its price, and Guex found that price in the archives. On 24 January 1932 Adolf Jöhr of Credit Suisse, advising the finance minister, wrote that the strictest secrecy had to be kept and that indiscretions during bank inspections should be punished under criminal law. Banque d’Escompte Suisse and the association of cantonal banks pressed the same point that year. A draft from the federal administration in February 1933 already contained the secrecy article.1
Parliament passed the Banking Act on 8 November 1934, in the National Council by 119 votes to 1.2 Article 47 turned a private duty into a public offence. From then on the state prosecuted a breach even without a complaint, and the penalty was up to six months in prison or a fine of up to 20,000 francs.5
Parliament barely discussed the article. Guex gives the Social Democrats’ reasons for staying quiet: they had just lost a vote on lifting secrecy, they feared sinking the whole Act, and they cared more about capital exports and interest rates.1
How Historians Read Article 47
How should one read all this? The Bergier Commission, the independent panel of historians that Switzerland itself set up in 1996, put it soberly in its final report. In 1934 the point was above all to give Swiss asset management the best possible legal framework and to put a stop to foreign bank espionage.5 Tobias Straumann, economic historian at the University of Zurich, calls Article 47 a first defensive measure against German and French attempts to get capital back.6
So who was the article for? The plain reading of the record: the banks asked for it, the government had reasons of its own to agree, and parliament let it pass. The client was protected because protecting the client protected the business and, as Bern saw it, the sovereignty of the country.
The Banking Secrecy Legend and the Year It Was Born
Most of us learned a different story about Swiss banking secrecy. Agents of the Nazi regime were hunting for the savings of Jewish families in Switzerland, and a decent country answered with Article 47.
It is indeed a moving story. However, it has a date of birth, and the date is not 1934.
Where the Story Comes From
The historian Peter Hug went looking for its origin in the archives of the Bankers Association, the Federal Archives and the National Bank. In 1959 a senior Swiss banker defended banking secrecy in a speech in the United States. He spoke of personal liberty and of the Swiss tradition of asylum. Persecution under the Nazis did not come up. In November 1966 the bulletin of Schweizerische Kreditanstalt ran an unsigned article on the roots of Swiss banking secrecy. It said the law had been tightened in 1934 to protect the persecuted. Hug found no earlier trace of the claim in Switzerland. An American book published the same year told a similar tale, built around an episode set a full year after the secrecy article had first been drafted.7
From there the story travelled into law journals, into newspapers, and in 1970 into an official message of the Federal Council. Critics of the banks repeated it as readily as their defenders.7
Why then? The Basel historian Georg Kreis points to the moment. Swiss banks were under attack abroad, above all in the United States, and the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials had just brought the fate of Europe’s Jews before a wide public. A humanitarian origin was a better answer than a commercial one.8
What the Evidence Says
The evidence does not depend on anyone’s politics. The first demand for criminal protection dates from January 1932, a year before Hitler became chancellor. A researcher who went through the files behind the Banking Act in the 1980s found no mention of such a motive, and neither did Hug.7 Vogler, who worked for UBS, files the story under legend.2 And the Bergier Commission states that Article 47 was not, as was sometimes claimed later, about protecting the assets of Jewish clients from the Nazi regime.5
Two things should be said in fairness.
First, people fleeing persecution did benefit from Swiss discretion once the law existed, and from the stability of the country as a whole. Vogler cites German trade union funds brought to safety in 1933, and Kreis notes that Jewish refugees may have been among the early beneficiaries.2 8 That was an effect of the law, however, and not its reason.
Second, the legend is not a harmless embellishment. It borrows the suffering of real families to dignify a commercial decision. And it does the banks no favours, because it invites the very comparison the industry had to live through in the 1990s.
The Citizens’ Half of Banking Secrecy
If the story ended here, it would be a tidy tale about an industry and its law. It does not end here, because the Swiss kept being asked, and kept giving the same answer.
The citizen’s side of Swiss banking secrecy was never really Article 47. It was a rule of tax law. A federal tax decree of December 1940 separated tax evasion, an administrative offence, from tax fraud, a crime. Straumann notes that this distinction had nothing to do with wealth management. It came out of the liberal tradition of the country: the citizen declares, the state trusts, and the tax office does not go through your bank statements unless documents have been forged.6
Only later, when international legal assistance was built on the principle that an act must be punishable in both countries, did this domestic rule become a wall for foreign tax authorities.6 Seen that way, foreign clients were free riders on an arrangement the Swiss had made with their own state.
Banking Secrecy at the Ballot Box
The ballot box supports that reading. In 1984, after a series of bank scandals, the Social Democrats put an initiative to the vote that would have obliged banks to give information to the authorities in tax matters. 73 per cent said no. Not one canton said yes. The survey afterwards found that opponents had feared above all for their privacy.9
Thirty years later the question came back. When a reform of tax criminal law threatened to loosen Swiss banking secrecy at home, a committee led by the SVP, with members of the FDP and CVP, collected 117,596 signatures to write financial privacy into the constitution. Parliament then abandoned the reform, and in January 2018 the committee withdrew its initiative.10
Who Owns the Secret
During that debate the association of Swiss private banks made a remark worth keeping. It was not for the banks to decide, it said, because banking secrecy belongs to the citizens and taxpayers.11 A lawyer would put it more dryly. The client owns the secret, and only the client can waive it. The bank merely carries the duty.
There is an honest counter-argument, and it belongs here. A rule that shields every honest saver from a curious state also shields the dishonest one from a legitimate tax bill. That case has been made for a hundred years, and it has lost each time it reached the voters. That is a democratic fact, whatever one thinks of the outcome.
Privacy has not become a smaller subject since. Today the sharper question is often how much your own bank collects about you, and whether all the disclosure we sign is transparency or box-ticking.
The Hard Chapter: 1945 to 1998
A rule is judged by its use. The fifty years after the war include the part of this history that is hardest to read, and it should be told without exaggeration in either direction.
In Washington in 1946, Swiss negotiators promised to find a solution for the accounts of victims of Nazi persecution who would never return to claim them. It took until 1962 for registration to become compulsory. The exercise turned up about a thousand accounts worth less than 10 million francs.7
The Volcker Audit and the Bergier Commission
In 1996 an independent audit began under Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve. Up to 650 accountants went through the records of 54 banks. When they reported in December 1999, they had identified 53,886 accounts with a possible link to victims. Their findings were balanced, and both halves deserve to be repeated. They found no evidence of systematic destruction of records, of organised discrimination, or of a concerted effort to divert victims’ funds. They also found that the handling of these accounts had often been grossly insensitive and in some cases unfair. The two big banks had settled the American class action in 1998 for 1.25 billion dollars.12
Switzerland then did something few countries have done. It appointed an independent commission of historians under Jean-François Bergier and ruled that neither banking secrecy nor any other provision could stand in the way of its research.5 The commission’s final report is one of the sources of this post.
Chiasso and the Road to Due Diligence
The same decades brought scandals of another kind. In 1977 the Chiasso branch of Kreditanstalt was found to have placed about 2.2 billion francs of client money in a Liechtenstein company, off its books. The banks answered that same year with their first due diligence agreement. The 1980s brought the Marcos and Duvalier cases and the resignation of a Federal Councillor. Money laundering became a criminal offence in 1990, and the Anti-Money Laundering Act followed in 1998.2
There is a pattern in this. Each crisis removed one group from the protection of the secret: first criminals, then dictators. By 2000 Swiss banking secrecy still covered one large group of foreign clients, people whose only offence was not telling their tax office at home.
How the Banks’ Half of Banking Secrecy Ended
For foreign clients, the end of Swiss banking secrecy came quickly.
In February 2009 UBS admitted to having helped American clients evade tax. It paid 780 million dollars and, with the approval of the Federal Council, handed over data on some 250 clients. A treaty that summer committed Switzerland to review a further 4,450 files.13 On 13 March 2009 the Federal Council accepted the OECD standard on administrative assistance. For foreign tax authorities the old line between evasion and fraud was gone.14
The rest followed within a few years. Wegelin, the country’s oldest private bank, broke up in 2012, and a US court convicted it a year later. Under a programme of the US Department of Justice, 80 Swiss banks paid 1.36 billion dollars in penalties. Since July 2014 Swiss banks report their American clients to Washington, the regime known as FATCA.15
In 2017 the legal basis for the automatic exchange of information took effect.14 In 2025 the Federal Tax Administration sent data on about 3.8 million accounts to partner states, in an exchange that now covers 110 countries.16
What the End of Banking Secrecy Cost
It is worth being precise about what happened. No foreign power forced open a Swiss vault. A number of banks had served clients on foreign soil in ways that broke the law of the host country, which is one reason cross-border rules are taken so seriously today. The whole financial centre paid for it.
Still, the price was real. Bankers had warned that the sector’s share of Swiss value added would halve without the old distinction. Ten years on, the NZZ found that the banks’ share had indeed almost halved, to 4.6 per cent.14
But the money did not leave. At the end of 2024 Switzerland was still the world’s leading centre for cross-border wealth, with about 2.7 trillion dollars booked here, up 6 per cent in a year, and Hong Kong closing in fast.17
What Remains of Swiss Banking Secrecy Today
Three things remain of Swiss banking secrecy, and they point in different directions.
Banking Secrecy at Home
At home, the old rule stands. A Swiss tax office still cannot obtain bank data on a Swiss resident merely because it suspects evasion. Foreign authorities receive information on their taxpayers through the Federal Tax Administration, while that same administration remains constrained with its own.18 The citizens’ half of Swiss banking secrecy has outlived the banks’ half.
Article 47 Today
Article 47 is sharper than in 1934. The maximum penalty is now three years in prison, five if money is made from the breach. Since 2015 the article applies not only to bank staff but to anyone who passes on or exploits a secret disclosed to them. Parliament wanted to stop the sale of stolen client data, and the committee that drafted the change wrote that press freedom remained protected by the general rules on media liability.19
Swiss newsrooms nevertheless stayed out of the international reporting on Credit Suisse accounts in 2022, citing the legal risk. The National Council asked the government to review the law. The Council of States declined, and in December 2023 asked the Federal Council to examine instead whether publishing unlawfully obtained data should be punishable more generally.20
Defenders of the article say that a client’s data deserves protection from thieves no matter who ends up printing it. Critics say that a law aimed at data dealers should not make reporters nervous. Both arguments are serious, and the question is therefore still open.
The Archives
Finally, the archives are hard to enter. In 2023 the Swiss Society for History sent the Federal Department of Finance a letter signed by 1,700 historians. It said that research on the financial centre is largely blocked because banks refuse access to their records.21 For a country that came out of the Bergier years with credit, that is a pity. The history told in this post rests on archives that were open.
What I Take From It
Swiss wealth management never rested on banking secrecy as much as we believed. Vogler ranked the reasons clients came to Switzerland back in 2005: political stability and the rule of law, a stable currency, a sound banking system. Secrecy came further down his list.2 More than fifteen years after 2009, the assets are still here. So is the industry, even if it looks different since Credit Suisse disappeared.
Discretion and secrecy are different things. Clients have every right to keep their wealth private from neighbours, competitors and the press. Indeed, that need has not shrunk. What has ended is privacy from the client’s own tax office abroad, and no serious bank or independent wealth manager should wish it back.
The true story is the better story. A small neutral country with a hard currency and a habit of minding its own business. Banks that defended their advantage, as any industry would. A government that defended its sovereignty against foreign informants. And citizens who, asked several times over a century, chose privacy from their own state. In other words, nothing in that needs a legend.
The domestic rule deserves to be defended on its own terms. There is a real liberal argument for a state that trusts the declaration and does not read the statements. It is strongest when it stands alone.
So, for the banks or for the citizens? The article was written for the banks. The principle behind it belonged to the citizens. The banks’ half ended in 2009. The citizens still hold theirs, and it will last as long as it is used well. That is the honest history of Swiss banking secrecy, and it is a good one.
A Short Timeline of Swiss Banking Secrecy
- 1910. A Swiss bank advertises its discretion to clients in France.
- 1922. Swiss voters reject a federal wealth levy, 736,952 to 109,702.
- January 1932. First recorded demand from a banker for criminal protection of secrecy.
- 27 October 1932. French police search the Paris offices of Basler Handelsbank.
- February 1933. The first draft of the Banking Act contains a secrecy article.
- 8 November 1934. Parliament passes the Banking Act with Article 47.
- 1940. A federal tax decree separates evasion from fraud.
- 1962. Registration of the assets of victims of Nazi persecution becomes compulsory.
- 1966. The story of a humanitarian origin first appears in print in Switzerland.
- 1977. Chiasso scandal and first due diligence agreement.
- 1984. 73 per cent of Swiss voters reject the initiative on banking secrecy.
- 1998 to 2002. Settlement on dormant accounts, Volcker audit, Bergier report.
- 2009. UBS hands over client data. Switzerland accepts the OECD standard.
- 2015. Article 47 is extended to third parties.
- 2017. Automatic exchange of information begins.
- 2018. The privacy initiative is withdrawn. Swiss banking secrecy at home stays.
If you spot something here that is wrong or out of date, tell me, and I will correct it.
Sources
- Sébastien Guex, “The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law and Its Repercussions for Swiss Federal Policy”, Business History Review, 2000 (University of Lausanne repository)
- Robert U. Vogler, “Das Schweizer Bankgeheimnis: Entstehung, Bedeutung, Mythos”, Verein für Finanzgeschichte, 2005 (PDF)
- Sébastien Guex, “Finanzplatz”, Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz
- Christophe Farquet, “La défense du paradis fiscal suisse avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale”, Alphil, 2016 (open access)
- Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War (Bergier Commission), Final Report, 2002, pp. 7–8 and 266–267 (PDF, German)
- Tobias Straumann, “Wo würden Sie Vermögen anlegen?”, Schweizer Monat, March 2010
- Peter Hug, “Steuerflucht und die Legende vom antinazistischen Ursprung des Bankgeheimnisses”, in Tanner/Weigel (eds.), Gedächtnis, Geld und Gesetz, 2000 (PDF)
- Georg Kreis, “Legende vom uneigennützigen Bankgeheimnis”, TagesWoche, 10 February 2012
- Swissvotes, popular vote of 20 May 1984, summary (PDF)
- Année Politique Suisse, “Ja zum Schutz der Privatsphäre”, 2013–2018 (PDF)
- Vereinigung Schweizerischer Privatbanken, statement on the counter-proposal, September 2016 (PDF)
- swissinfo, “Holocaust report cites no systematic abuse by Swiss banks”, 6 December 1999
- SRF, “Der Anfang vom Ende des Schweizer Bankgeheimnisses”
- NZZ, on the cost of the end of banking secrecy to the financial centre
- swissinfo, “Swiss-US tax evasion saga: where are we now?”, 28 January 2016
- Federal Tax Administration, media release on the automatic exchange of information, 10 October 2025
- swissinfo, “Swiss losing ground faster to Asian rivals in wealth, BCG says”, 24 June 2025
- swissinfo, “Angekündigtes Ende des Bankgeheimnisses auch in der Schweiz”, 12 December 2014
- National Council Committee for Economic Affairs and Taxation, report on parliamentary initiative 10.450, 19 May 2014 (PDF)
- Edito, “Ständerat: kein Ohr für die Anliegen des Journalismus”
- swissinfo, “Banken blockieren Forschung zum Schweizer Finanzplatz”, 23 February 2023
Source: https://vapa.ch/swiss-banking-secrecy-history/ · vapa.ch


